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We demonstrate that the framework of bounded quantum reference frames has application
to building quantum-public-key cryptographic protocols and proving their security. Thus,
the framework we introduce can be seen as a public-key analogue of the framework of
Bartlett et al. [1], where a private shared reference frame is shown to have cryptographic
application. The protocol we present in this paper is an identification scheme, which,
like a digital signature scheme, is a type of authentication scheme. We prove that our
protocol is both reusable and secure under the honest-verifier assumption. Thus, we also
demonstrate that secure reusable quantum-public-key authentication is possible to some
extent.
1 Introduction
Since its inception, the focus of quantum cryptography has been on the symmetric-key model,
where Alice and Bob attempt to generate private shared correlations (as in quantum key distri-
bution [2, 3]) or are assumed to hold them (as in quantum authentication [4]). Such correlations
can usually be defined or encoded by a string of bits—the secret key—but Bartlett et al. [1]
showed that they may also take the form of a private shared reference frame. Symmetric-key
quantum protocols are usually unconditionally secure, meaning that the sole assumption is that
(some part of) quantum theory is correct; however, Damgaard et al. [5, 6] have investigated
information-theoretically secure protocols, such as password-based identification and bit com-
mitment, in the bounded quantum storage model, where an extra assumption is that the size
or quality of the adversary’s quantum memory is limited (see also Refs [7, 8, 9]).3
Going beyond the symmetric-key model, but retaining unconditional security, Gottesman
and Chuang [11] introduced quantum-public-key cryptography—where the public keys are
∗lmi@iqc.ca
†mmosca@iqc.ca
3The bounded storage model for classical protocols (e.g. Ref. [10]), where the adversary’s classical memory
is assumed to be bounded, also gives information-theoretic security.
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quantum systems, each of whose state encodes the (same) classical private key—by giving
a secure one-time (digital) signature scheme for signing classical messages.
A public-key framework eliminates the need for Alice and Bob to establish private shared
correlations, which has practical advantages in large networks of users (where there may be
many “Alices” or “Bobs”). Alice chooses a random private key, creates copies of the corre-
sponding public key, and distributes the copies in an authenticated fashion to all potential
“Bobs”. In principle, this asymmetric setup allows, e.g., any Bob to send encrypted messages
to Alice or to verify any signature for a message that Alice digitally signed, thus significantly
reducing the number of secret/private keys involved as compared to the case where each Alice-
Bob pair shares a secret key and uses symmetric-key protocols. Thus the public-key framework
vastly simplifies key distribution, which is often the most costly part of any cryptosystem.
Note that the security of classical public-key protocols is necessarily based on computational
assumptions [12].
The mapping that takes a private key to the state of the corresponding quantum public
key is always assumed to be publicly known. Furthermore, in any reasonable quantum-public-
key system, the states of two quantum public keys corresponding to two different private keys
always have overlap less than (1− δ), for some positive and publicly known δ. Thus, a striking
aspect of quantum-public-key cryptography that sets it apart from its classical counterpart
is that the number of copies of the (quantum) public key in circulation must be limited. If
this were not the case, then an adversary could collect an arbitrarily large number of copies,
measure them all, and determine the private key.
The limit on the number of copies of the quantum public key implies that not everyone
can use the protocol; however, in practice, the maximum number of users (or uses) of any
particular protocol can be estimated, and thus the parameters of the protocol can be adjusted
so that the limit allows for this maximum. Increasing this limit would presumably result in a
less efficient instance of the protocol, and this is one kind of tradeoff between efficiency and
usability in the quantum-public-key setting. Another kind concerns reusability. For instance,
the abovementioned signature scheme is “one-time” because only one message may be signed
under a particular key-value, even though many different users can verify that one signature. If a
second message needs to be signed, the signer must choose a new private key and then distribute
corresponding new public keys. One open problem is thus whether there exist reusable signature
schemes, where either the same copy of the public key can be used to verify many different
message-signature pairs securely, or where just the same key-values can be used to verify many
different message-signature pairs securely (but a fresh copy of the public key is needed for each
verification). The latter notion of “reusability” is what we adopt here.
What makes a key public? In principle, Alice’s public-key-generation algorithm, which takes
as input the private key and outputs one copy of the quantum public key, may output a system
in a pure state or a mixed state, from Alice’s point of view (a mixed state is a fixed probabilistic
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distribution of pure states). In the original framework of Gottesman and Chuang, the algorithm
is assumed to produce a system in a pure state. For some applications, like digital signature
schemes, this purity is crucial; for, otherwise, Alice could cheat by sending different public keys
to different “Bobs”. Purity prevents Alice’s cheating here because different “Bobs” can compare
their copies of the public key via a “distributed swap-test” [11] to see if they are the same (with
high probability), much like can be done in the case of classical public keys. But the ability to
do an equality test benefits any scheme, since an adversary who tries to substitute bad keys for
legitimate ones could thus be caught. Indeed, if the public-key-generation algorithm produces
a mixed state, since there is no equality test guaranteed to recognize when two mixed states are
equal, then no such test for equality of public keys may be possible—this is at odds with what
it means to be “public”, i.e., publicly verifiable.4 While the scheme we present in this paper
does not explicitly make use of the “distributed swap-test” (since we assume the public keys
have been distributed securely), it can do so in principle. We view this as analogous to how
modern public-key protocols do not explicitly specify an equality test among unsure “Bobs”,
but how the framework naturally allows such a test which would thwart attempts to distribute
fake public keys.
Our work appears to be of a dramatically different character when compared to other
explorations of quantum-public-key protocols [15, 13, 14, 16, 17]: we demonstrate that the
framework of bounded quantum reference frames [18] has application to building such protocols
and proving their security. Thus, the framework we introduce can be seen as a public-key
analogue of the framework of Bartlett et al. [1].
We stress that our work in public-key quantum cryptography strives for unconditional secu-
rity, as opposed to security based on computational assumptions [12]. In particular, our work
is unrelated to the work in Ref. [19], where classical public-key systems (whose security must
be based on computational assumptions) are constructed that require a quantum computer for
the generation of the public keys.
The protocol we present in this paper is an identification scheme, which, like a digital
signature scheme, is a type of authentication scheme. Authentication schemes are not concerned
with ensuring the privacy of information, but rather seek to ensure its integrity. For example,
digital signature schemes (and message authentication codes) ensure the integrity of origin of
messages, whereas identification schemes ensure the integrity of origin of communication in real
time [12]. Identification protocols are said to ensure “aliveness”—that the entity proving its
identity is active at the time the protocol is executed.
We prove that our identification protocol is both reusable and secure under the honest-
verifier assumption (defined in the next section). Thus, we also demonstrate that secure reusable
4Other authors have defined the framework to include mixed public keys, and Ref. [13] proposes an encryption
scheme with mixed public keys that is reusable and unconditionally secure [14].
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quantum-public-key authentication is possible to some extent.
We now proceed with a description of our protocol (Section 2) and the honest-verifier
security proof (Section 3).
2 An identification scheme
In the following, Alice and Bob are always assumed to be honest players and Eve is always as-
sumed to be the adversary. Suppose Alice generates a private key and authentically distributes
copies of the corresponding public key to any potential users of the scheme, including Bob.
The following is a description (adapted from Section 4.7.5.1 in Goldreich’s book [20]) of
how a secure public-key identification scheme works. If Alice wants to identify herself to Bob
(i.e. prove that it is she with whom he is communicating), she invokes the identification
protocol by first telling Bob that she is Alice, so that Bob knows he should use the public key
corresponding to Alice (assuming Bob possesses public keys from many different people). The
ensuing protocol (whatever it is) has the property that the prover Alice can convince the verifier
Bob (except, possibly, with negligible probability) that she is indeed Alice, but an adversary Eve
cannot fool Bob (except with negligible probability) into thinking that she is Alice, even after
having listened in on the protocol between Alice and Bob or having participated as a (devious)
verifier in the protocol with Alice several times. An honest-verifier identification protocol is
only intended to be secure under the extra assumption that, whenever Eve engages the prover
Alice in the protocol, Eve follows the verification protocol as if she were honest. Note that no
identification protocol is secure against an attack where Eve concurrently acts as a verifier with
Alice and as a prover with Bob (but note also that, in such a case, the “aliveness” property
is still guaranteed). Note also that, by our definition of “reusable,” an identification scheme is
considered reusable if Alice can prove her identity many times using the same key-values but
the verifier needs a fresh copy of the public key for each instance of the protocol.
A couple of remarks are in order:
• In practice, public-key identification schemes are implemented in smart-card systems
(e.g., inside an automated teller machine (ATM) for access to a bank account, or beside
a doorway for access to a building), so that the smart card “proves” to the card reader
that it is authorized.5 In such situations, it may be relatively difficult for an adversary
to tamper with the verification procedure that is encoded in the card reader, in which
case an honest-verifier identification protocol may suffice. For example, an honest-verifier
identification protocol is secure against the class of attacks whereby an adversary collects
5Note that it is not a user’s personal identification number (PIN) that functions as the prover’s private key;
the PIN only serves to authenticate the user to the smart card (not the smart card to the card reader).
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the maximum number of legitimate copies of the public key and uses these in conjunction
with a phony smart card to act as a dishonest prover.
• Note that public-key identification can be trivially achieved via a digital signature scheme
(Alice signs a random message presented by Bob), but since we do not know of an un-
conditionally secure and reusable digital signature scheme, our scheme is noteworthy.
Similarly, public-key identification can be achieved with a public-key encryption scheme
(Bob sends an encrypted random challenge to Alice, who returns it decrypted), but we do
not know of an unconditionally secure and reusable public-key encryption scheme (that
uses pure public keys; though, see Ref. [15] for a promising candidate).
A summary of our protocol is as follows. Alice chooses a private phase reference and
distributes a limited number of samples of her reference frame as quantum public keys. The
samples are used by Bob to verify that the prover is actually Alice. Because Alice has a perfect
phase reference, she can carry out the identification protocol with no error (assuming perfect
quantum channels). But, because Eve only has a bounded quantum phase reference frame (in
the form of a limited number of copies of the public key), she inevitably incurs an error that
Bob can detect with sufficiently high probability (we discuss quantum phase reference frames
in more detail in Section 3.4.1).
2.1 Protocol specification
Our identification protocol takes the form of a typical “challenge-response” interactive proof
system, consisting of a kernel (or subprotocol) that is repeated several times in order to amplify
the security, i.e., reduce the probability that an adversary can break the protocol. We assume
all quantum channels are perfect.
Parameters
• The security parameter s ∈ Z+
⋄ equals the number of kernel iterations.
⋄ The probability that Eve can break the protocol (in an honest-verifier setting) is
exponentially small in s.
• The reusability parameter r ∈ Z+
⋄ equals the maximum number of copies of the quantum public key in circulation and
⋄ equals the maximum number of times the protocol may be executed by Alice, before
she needs to pick a new private key.
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Keys
• The private key is
(x1, x2, . . . , xs), (1)
where Alice chooses each xj , j = 1, 2, . . . , s, independently and uniformly randomly from
{1, 2, . . . , 2r + 1}.
⋄ The value xj is used only in the jth kernel-iteration.
• One copy of the public key is an s-partite system in the state
⊗sj=1|ψxj〉, (2)
where (omitting normalization factors)
|ψxj〉 := |0〉+ e2πixj/(2r+1) |1〉 . (3)
⋄ Alice authentically distributes (e.g. via trusted courier) at most r copies of the
public key.
⋄ The jth subsystem of the public key (which is in the state |ψxj〉) is only used in the
jth kernel-iteration.
Actions
• The kernel K(x) of the protocol is the following three steps, where we use the shorthand
φx := 2πx/(r + 1), (4)
and where we have dropped the subscript “j” from “xj”.
(1) Bob creates |0〉 |1〉+ |1〉 |0〉, and sends one register of this system to Alice.
(2) Alice measures the received register in the basis {|0〉± eiφx |1〉}. If the state of the
register immediately after the measurement is |0〉+ eiφx |1〉, then Alice sends “0” to Bob;
otherwise, Alice sends “1”.
(3) If Bob receives “1”, then he applies the Pauli-Z gate
Z :=
[
1 0
0 −1
]
(5)
6
to the register that he kept in Step 1. Finally, Bob swap-tests6 this register with his
authentic copy of |ψx〉.
• When Alice wants to identify herself to Bob, they take the following actions:
(i) Alice checks that she has not yet engaged in the protocol r times before with the
current value of the private key; if she has, she aborts (and refreshes the private and
public keys).
(ii) Alice sends Bob her purported identity (“Alice”), so that Bob may retrieve the
public keys corresponding to Alice.
(iii) The kernel K(x) is repeated s times, for x = x1, x2, . . . , xs. Bob “accepts” if all
the swap-tests passed; otherwise, Bob “rejects”.
2.2 Completeness of the protocol
It is clear that the protocol is correct for honest players, that is, Bob always “accepts” when
Alice is the prover. To see this, note that, up to global phase, the state |0〉 |1〉+ |1〉 |0〉 equals
(|0〉+ eiφx|1〉)(|0〉+ eiφx |1〉)− (|0〉 − eiφx |1〉)(|0〉 − eiφx |1〉). (7)
In the next section, we will prove that the protocol is also secure, under the honest-verifier
assumption.
3 Honest-verifier security
Let us clearly define what Eve is allowed to do in our honest-verifier model. Eve can
• passively monitor Alice’s and Bob’s interactions (which means that Eve can read the
classical bits sent by Alice, and read the bit that indicates whether Bob “accepts” or
“rejects”), and
• participate as the verifier, but only performing the actions as if she were honest, and
6The swap-test of two registers (labelled 2 and 3) in the states |ξ〉
2
and |χ〉
3
is a measurement (with respect
to the computational basis {|0〉
1
, |1〉
1
}) of the control register (labelled 1) of the state
(H1 ⊗ I2 ⊗ I3)(c− swap2,3)(|0〉1 + |1〉1)|ξ〉2|χ〉3/
√
2, (6)
where H1 is the usual Hadamard gate (applied to register 1) and c − swap2,3 is the controlled-swap gate.
The probability that the state is |0〉
1
immediately after the measurement—which corresponds to a pass—is
(1+ | 〈ξ|χ〉 |2)/2. When the registers 2 and 3 are in the mixed states ρ and ρ′, this probability is (1+ tr(ρρ′))/2.
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• participate as the prover in one or more instances of the protocol.
Note that Eve is assumed not to be able to actively interfere with Alice’s and Bob’s communi-
cations when Alice and Bob are participating in the protocol, as this would allow Eve to be a
dishonest verifier by stealing the qubits Bob sends to Alice and replacing them with her own
qubits.
Immediately, we see that Eve’s passive monitoring only gives her independent and random
bits (plus the bit corresponding to “accept”), and thus gives her no useful information (in the
sense that she may as well generate random bits herself). We can therefore ignore the effects
of her passive monitoring.
With regard to Eve acting as verifier, note that, in the kernel iteration K(x), Eve can at
best extract one extra copy of |ψx〉 from Alice when Eve follows the verifier protocol honestly in
Step 1, by not bothering to do the swap-test in Step 3. Eve is technically not allowed not to do
the swap-test in our honest-verifier setting, but we show that—even if she is allowed—then the
protocol is secure (as long as Eve is honest in Step 1). This allows Eve to obtain a maximum of
r extra copies (recall Alice only participates in the protocol r times before refreshing her keys)
of the public key in addition to any copies she obtains legitimately. Let t be the total number
of copies of the public key that Eve has in her possession. Note that t ≤ 2r−1, since we always
assume that at least one copy is left for Bob, so that Eve can carry out the protocol with him.
Therefore, to prove security in our setting, it suffices to consider attacks where Eve is armed
with her t copies of the public key and she participates as a prover in order to try to cause Bob
to “accept”. We use the following definition of “security”.
Definition 1 (Security). An honest-verifier identification protocol (for honest prover Alice
and honest verifier Bob) is secure with error ǫ if the probability that Bob “accepts” when any
adversary Eve participates in the protocol as a prover is less than ǫ (assuming that, whenever
Eve engages Alice in the protocol, Eve follows the verification protocol honestly).
We will assume that Eve has always extracted the r illegitimate copies of the public key
from Alice, and we define t′ to be the number of copies that Eve obtained legitimately:
t = r + t′. (8)
Note that Eve can make at most (r− t′) attempts at fooling Bob, i.e., causing Bob to “accept”.
Most of the argument, beginning in Section 3.1, is devoted to showing that
Pr[Eve fools Bob on first attempt, using t copies] (9)
≤ (1− 1/8(t+ 1))s. (10)
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In general, Eve learns something from one attempt to the next; however, because Eve can
simulate her interaction with Bob at the cost of using one copy of |ψx〉 per simulated iteration
of K(x), we have, for ℓ = 2, 3, . . . , (r − t′),
Pr[Eve fools Bob on ℓth attempt, using t copies]
≤ Pr[Eve fools Bob on first attempt, using (t+ ℓ− 1) copies].
Given this, we use the union bound:
Pr[Eve fools Bob at least once, using t copies]
≤
r−t′∑
ℓ=1
Pr[Eve fools Bob on ℓth attempt, using t copies]
≤
r−t′∑
ℓ=1
Pr[Eve fools Bob on first attempt, using (t+ ℓ− 1) copies]
≤
r−t′∑
ℓ=1
(1− 1/8(t+ ℓ))s
≤ (r − t′)(1− 1/16r)s.
It follows that the probability that Eve can fool Bob at least once, that is, break the protocol,
is
Pbreak ≤ r(1− 1/16r)s, (11)
which, for fixed r, is exponentially small in s. Note that this bound is likely not tight, since it
ultimately assumes that all of Eve’s attempts are equally as powerful. In particular, this bound
assumes that Eve’s copies do not degrade with each use. A more detailed analysis using results
about degradation of quantum reference frames [18] may be possible.
From Eq. (11) follows our main theorem:
Theorem 1 (Honest-verifier-security of the protocol). For any ǫ > 0 and any r ∈ Z+, the
identification protocol specified in Section 2.1 is secure with error ǫ according to Definition 1 if
s ∈ Ω(r log(r/ǫ)). (12)
The theorem shows how the efficiency of the protocol scales with its reusability.
The remainder of the paper establishes the bound in Lines (9) and (10).
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3.1 Sufficiency of individual attacks
At each iteration, Eve should take some action, which we may assume takes the form of a
measurement, in order to get an answer to send back to Bob. In general, Eve can mount a
coherent attack, whereby her actions during iteration j may involve systems that she used or
will use in previous or future iterations as well as systems consisting of copies of the state
|ψxk〉 for any k—not just for k = j. Intuition suggests that, since each xj is independently
selected from the set {1, 2, . . . , 2r + 1}, Eve’s measurement at iteration j may be assumed to
be independent of her measurement at any other iteration and in particular does not need
to act on any components of copies of the public key other than those corresponding to the
copies of |ψxj〉. In other words, it seems plausible that Eve’s optimal strategy can without loss of
generality consist of the “product” of identical optimal strategies for each iteration individually.
Indeed, this intuition can be shown to be correct by combining a technique from Ref. [21], for
expressing the maximum probability of acceptance in a two-message quantum interactive proof
system as a semidefinite program, with a result in Ref. [22], which implies that the semidefinite
program satisfies the product rule that we need; see the Appendix for a proof. The remainder of
Section 3 establishes that the probability of passing the swap-test for any particular iteration
is at most 1 − 1/8(t + 1), and thus, by the result proved in the Appendix, the probability of
passing all s swap-tests is at most (1− 1/8(t+ 1))s.
3.2 Equivalence of discrete and continuous private phases
Now, we show that, from Bob’s and Eve’s points of view, Alice’s choosing the private phase
angle φx from the discrete set {2πx/(2r+1) : x = 1, 2, . . . , 2r+1} is equivalent to her choosing
the phase angle from the continuous interval [0, 2π). We have argued that the only information
that Eve or Bob (or anyone but Alice) has about φx may be assumed to come from a number
of copies of |ψx〉 that can be no greater than 2r (there are r legitimate copies of the public key,
and one can extract r more copies from Alice); let this number be c, where 1 ≤ c ≤ 2r. We
may describe the state of these c systems by the density operator
1
2r + 1
2r+1∑
x=1
1
2c
((|0〉+ e2πix/(2r+1) |1〉)(〈0|+ e−2πix/(2r+1) 〈1|))⊗c. (13)
Had φx been chosen uniformly from {2πx/(2r + 1) : x ∈ [0, 2r + 1)} = [0, 2π), they would
describe the state by
1
2π
∫ 2π
0
1
2c
((|0〉+ eiφ |1〉)(〈0|+ e−iφ 〈1|))⊗cdφ. (14)
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It is straightforward to show that the above two density operators are both equal to
1
2c
c∑
w=0
(
c
w
)
|Scw〉〈Scw|, (15)
where |Scw〉 is the normalized symmetric sum of all
(
c
w
)
states in {|0〉, |1〉}⊗c whose binary labels
have Hamming weight w.7 Thus, without loss, we may drop the subscript “x” on “φx”, write
“φ” for Alice’s private phase angle, and assume she did (somehow) choose φ uniformly randomly
from [0, 2π).8
3.3 Sufficiency of maximizing successful guessing probability
The security of our protocol follows from a result of Bartlett et al. [18], which concerns a
slightly different problem for Eve than the problem of her trying to cheat (fool) Bob. This
different problem is for Eve, using her t copies of |0〉 + eiφ |1〉, to guess whether she has been
given the system |0〉+ eiφ|1〉 or |0〉 − eiφ|1〉, where each case occurs with equal probability and φ
is unknown and uniformly randomly chosen from [0, 2π). The purpose of this section is to show
that any good cheating strategy gives a good guessing strategy; we will show that an upper
bound on the average successful guessing probability gives an upper bound on the cheating
probability, so that, in order to prove security, it suffices to show that the maximum successful
guessing probability is sufficiently small (which we will do in the next section).
Any cheating strategy of Eve can be modeled as follows. Let
|±〉 := |0〉 ± eiφ|1〉. (18)
7This requires the following two facts: (1) for any integer a,
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
eiaθdθ =
{
0 if a 6= 0 ,
1 otherwise ;
(16)
and (2) for any integer p ≥ 2 and integer a:
1
p
p∑
k=1
e2piiak/p =
{
0 if a is not a multiple of p,
1 otherwise ,
(17)
where the second fact is applied at p = 2r + 1.
8One way to interpret this result is that even if Alice encodes infinitely many bits into φ, it is no better than
if she encoded ⌈log2(2r+1)⌉ bits. Note that if Eve performs an optimal phase estimation [23] in order to learn
φ and then cheat Bob, she can only learn at most ⌊log2(2r−1)⌋ bits of φ (here, we assume Eve has 2r−1 copies
of the public key, having left Bob one copy), whereas Alice actually encoded ⌈log2(2r + 1)⌉ bits into φ.
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Recall that Bob creates a system in the state |0〉|1〉+ |1〉|0〉, which equals |+〉|+〉 − |−〉|−〉 up
to global phase. Eve’s system before Bob sends one of his registers can be represented by |Ξ〉,
which consists of the t copies of |+〉 as well as any ancillary registers (which we can assume are
in a pure state). Eve’s (optimal) measurement can thus be modeled by a unitary operation UE
acting on her system (labeled E, which now includes the qubit Bob sends), which transforms
the state of the total system as follows:
1√
2
(|+〉B|+〉E − |−〉B|−〉E)|Ξ〉E 7→UE (19)
1√
2
(|+〉B(α|0〉E|ψ+0 〉E + β|1〉E |ψ+1 〉E)− (20)
|−〉B(γ|0〉E |ψ−0 〉E + δ|1〉E|ψ−1 〉E)
)
, (21)
so that the leftmost register of Eve’s system encodes her measurement outcome. Bob’s appli-
cation of the Z gate conditioned on the value of the measurement outcome can be modeled by
a controlled-Z gate (where Bob’s kept qubit, labeled B, is the target-qubit and the leftmost
qubit of Eve’s system is the control-qubit), which will take the state of the total system to
1√
2
(|+〉B(α|0〉E|ψ+0 〉E − δ|1〉E |ψ−1 〉E) + (22)
|−〉B(β|1〉E |ψ+1 〉E − γ|0〉E |ψ−0 〉E)
)
. (23)
Let τ represent the density operator for this state after Eve’s system has been traced out. The
probability that Bob’s swap-test passes is easily calculated to be
Ppass =
1 + 〈+| τ |+〉
2
(24)
=
1 + (|α|2 + |δ|2)/2
2
. (25)
Now, suppose Eve is faced with the different problem of guessing whether Bob gave her |+〉
or |−〉, where each case occurs with probability 1/2 (and where φ is unknown and uniformly
random in [0, 2π)). Since, as can be seen from the mapping in Line (19), UE maps
|+〉E|Ξ〉E 7→UE α|0〉E|ψ+0 〉E + β|1〉E |ψ+1 〉E (26)
|−〉E|Ξ〉E 7→UE γ|0〉E |ψ−0 〉E + δ|1〉E|ψ−1 〉E, (27)
Eve can use the same procedure she used for her attack in order to guess which state Bob
prepared: upon measuring her leftmost register, she guesses “|+〉” if she gets outcome “0”, and
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otherwise she guesses “|−〉”. The probability that she guesses successfully on average using
this strategy is clearly
Psucc =
1
2
× Pr(outcome =“0”|Bob prepared |+〉) + (28)
1
2
× Pr(outcome =“1”|Bob prepared |−〉) (29)
= (|α|2 + |δ|2)/2. (30)
Thus, any upper bound on Psucc gives an upper bound on Ppass.
3.4 Bounding the successful guessing probability
Bartlett et al. [18] give an expression for the average successful guessing probability in terms
of the state of a bounded phase reference frame (which, for us, takes the form of copies of the
public key). In Section 3.4.1, we give some background on (bounded) phase references so that
we can better understand the result in Ref. [18] in order to apply it. In Section 3.4.2, we derive
the bound on Eve’s successful guessing probability, establishing what was claimed in Lines (9)
and (10).
3.4.1 Phase reference frames
Consider the two qubit states “|0〉+|1〉” and “|0〉−|1〉” (the use of quotation marks will become
clear below). Given a qubit promised to be prepared in one of those two states, how could you
decide which state the given qubit is in? In general, without any other system to help you, you
cannot, because the question is not well defined: the states |0〉 and |1〉 are only defined up to
global phase, so, e.g., replacing |1〉 by −|1〉 changes your answer. A phase reference (frame) is a
quantum-mechanical system that, when taken together with the given qubit, fixes the relative
phase between |0〉 and |1〉 in the state “|0〉 + |1〉”. This intuitive definition suffices for our
purposes.
Note that usually in quantum information processing, it is assumed that one has a phase
reference, which ascribes definite meaning to the state “|0〉 + |1〉”. Similarly, in multiparty
quantum communication/cryptography protocols, it is usually assumed that all players involved
have access to a common phase reference, so that “|0〉 + |1〉” means the same thing to each
party. This is in fact a reasonable assumption, since it has been shown that, with modest
overhead, any set of players can simulate having a common (phase) reference frame, by using
the symmetric and anti-symmetric subspaces of entangled states [24].
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The most popular phase reference frame occurs in optics, and is known as a “coherent
state”, which is usually defined as the state
|Cθ〉 := e−α
2
2
∞∑
w=0
(αw/
√
w!)eiwθ|w〉, (31)
of a single (optical) mode, where α is a real number; this state encodes the (relative) phase
eiθ. The number w in |w〉 is the photon number. Employing a system in this state to first
prepare the given qubit and then to measure it, in order to solve the decision problem posed
above, fixes the relative phase of |0〉 and |1〉 in the superposition “|0〉+ |1〉” to be eiθ, i.e., this
superposition is now more correctly written |0〉+ eiθ|1〉.9 Normally, one would redefine |1〉 as
|1〉 := eiθ|1〉, and write the superposition as |0〉+ |1〉.
Note that there is still a slight problem in that θ is not really well defined, since it could
be replaced by any θ′ 6= θ and the physics of the problem would not change. We say that, in
the definition of the coherent state, the phase eiθ is defined relative to a hidden absolute phase
reference, which in practice means that the actual value of θ need not be known, but what is
important is that the relative phase eiθ stays consistent throughout all the quantum operations.
A single mode is mathematically modeled by CN , and a basis for this space is {|n〉 : n =
0, 1, . . . , N − 1} ; in general, as for the coherent state, N can equal ∞. Similarly, a k-mode
(multimode) phase reference is modeled by (CN)⊗k. It is convenient to adopt this optics-based
nomenclature (modes, photons) when discussing reference frames, though the following results
are completely general and do not rely on optical implementations.
In practice, any phase reference frame is bounded, meaning that the total energy, or average
total photon number, of the state is upper-bounded. For a multimode phase reference state,
this bound may take the form of an upper bound on the number k of modes and perhaps an
upper bound on the photon number of each mode. Generally, the higher the total energy of the
phase reference frame, the better it performs in practice, i.e., the better it maintains consistent
relative phase throughout a quantum computation.
9The precise way in which this preparation and measurement works in practice is beyond the scope of this
paper, but we give an intuitive explanation. First note that it is sufficient to implement the Hadamard gate
|0〉 7→ |0〉+ eiφ|1〉 (32)
eiθ|1〉 7→ |0〉 − eiφ|1〉. (33)
Since the coherent state is unchanged (up to global phase) under the operation |w〉 7→ |w − 1〉 (i.e. the annihi-
lation of a photon, which we note is not a unitary operation), it is possible to approximate the Hadamard gate
by approximately mapping |Cθ〉|0〉 7→ |Cθ〉(|0〉 + eiθ|1〉) by taking a photon from the coherent state to use in
the right-hand qubit; similarly, the operation |Cθ〉|1〉 7→ |Cθ〉(e−iθ|0〉 − |1〉) may be approximated. The quality
of the approximation depends on the total energy of the coherent state. See Ref. [25] for a complete analysis of
a similar task.
14
An example of a k-mode bounded phase reference frame encoding the phase eiθ is a system
of k qubits in the state
(|0〉+ eiθ|1〉)⊗k =
k∑
w=0
√(
k
w
)
eiwθ|Skw〉, (34)
where |Skw〉 is the k-mode state defined just after Eq. (15) (see Ref. [26] for a detailed discussion
of such “refbits”). For this multimode phase reference frame, the maximum photon number is
1 for each mode.
Define the unitary re-phasing map U(θ) on (Ck+1)⊗k as the mapping
|w1〉|w2〉 · · · |wk〉 7→ ei(w1+w2+···wk)θ|w1〉|w2〉 · · · |wk〉 (35)
for any θ ∈ [0, 2π] and all wl = 0, 1, . . . , k, for l = 1, 2, . . . , k. A unitary operation V on (Ck)⊗k
is said to be phase invariant if U(θ)V U(θ)† = V for all θ ∈ [0, 2π]. If V is phase invariant, one
does not need any phase reference to perform V ; e.g., Eve could use her own phase reference
(say, a coherent state encoding the phase eiθE) to carry out V on some register, and the result
would be the same (up to global phase) as if Alice performed V on the same register using
her own phase reference (a coherent state encoding the phase eiθA , θA 6= θE); for simplicity, we
have assumed that Eve’s and Alice’s phase references are perfect (see Section II.B of Bartlett
et al. [27] for more details). We will use the fact that U(θ) is phase invariant if and only if it
is block-diagonal with respect to subspaces of constant total photon number (see e.g. Ref. [25]
for a proof).
Definition 2 (Equivalence of phase reference frames). Suppose ρ1 and ρ2 are two states of a
multimode phase reference frame. Then a phase reference in state ρ1 and a phase reference in
state ρ2 are equivalent if there exists a phase-invariant unitary operation V such that
ρ1 = V ρ2V
†. (36)
Note that there is a phase-invariant unitary transformation on (Ck+1)⊗k that maps
|Skw〉 7→ |0〉⊗(k−1)|w〉, for all w = 0, 1, . . . , k, (37)
because this mapping may be completed on (Ck+1)⊗k to a unitary operator that is block-
diagonal with respect to subspaces of constant total photon number. Therefore, a multimode
phase reference in the state in Line (34) is equivalent to a single-mode phase reference in the
state
k∑
w=0
√(
k
w
)
eiwθ|w〉 (38)
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(where we have omitted the ancilla in the state |0〉⊗(k−1)), which we note looks like the coherent
state but for the moduli of the coefficients.
Finally, we define a special class of phase references.
Definition 3 (Covariant family of phase reference states). Let U(θ) be the unitary rephasing
map on CN such that U(θ)|w〉 = eiwθ|w〉 for all θ ∈ [0, 2π]. Suppose that {ρ(φ)}φ∈[0,2π] is a
family of (single-mode) phase reference states on CN , where ρ(φ) encodes the relative phase
eiφ. Then {ρ(φ)}φ∈[0,2π] is covariant if
ρ(φ) = U(φ)ρ(0)U(φ)† (39)
for all φ ∈ [0, 2π].
3.4.2 The bound
First we note that the effect of Alice’s selection of φ serves to completely randomize the relative
phase between |0〉 and |1〉 in any superposition of the two states, from the point of view of
anyone other than Alice. Thus, even though we make the usual assumption that all players
(Alice, Bob, Eve) share a common phase reference, the protocol effectively forces Alice to
have a private phase reference, leaving the other players with maximal ignorance (but for the
information contained in the copies of the public key) of what the “correct” relative phase is
in each iteration of the protocol. Therefore, Eve’s t copies of |0〉 + eiφ |1〉 may be seen as a
bounded multimode phase reference encoding the phase eiφ relative to a known common phase
reference—but for unknown and uniformly random φ ∈ [0, 2π).10
Bartlett et al. [18] prove the following theorem (rephrased for our purposes).
Theorem 2 (Optimal probability of successful guessing [18]). Suppose {ρ(φ)}φ∈[0,2π] is a co-
variant family of single-mode phase reference states, where ρ(φ) encodes the phase eiφ (relative
to a known common phase reference). Given a single mode in the state ρ(φ), for φ unknown
and uniformly random in [0, 2π), and a qubit in one of the two states |0〉 ± eiφ|1〉, where each
state occurs with probability 1/2, the optimal probability of successfully guessing which state the
given qubit is in is
P
succ
=
1
2
+
1
2
∞∑
m=0
ℜ(〈m+ 1| ρ(0)|m〉). (40)
10Note that our assumption that Alice, Bob, and Eve all share a perfect common phase reference implies that
Alice can make r samples of her phase reference with no degradation of the original phase reference. Thus, while
we are using the theoretical framework of (bounded) quantum reference frames from Refs [1, 18] in our analysis,
our initial assumptions are different than in those works (where the standard assumption that everyone shares
a perfect common phase reference is usually not used).
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We showed in the previous section that Eve’s multimode phase reference is equivalent to
the single-mode phase reference in the state
ρ(φ) :=
1
2t
t∑
w=0
t∑
w′=0
√(
t
w
)(
t
w′
)
ei(w−w
′)φ|w〉〈w′|. (41)
Substituting this value of ρ(φ) into the above theorem gives
Psucc =
1
2
+
1
2
1
2t
t−1∑
m=0
√(
t
m
)(
t
m+ 1
)
, (42)
which we can show to be in 1 − Ω(1/t) (up to logarithmic factors) using some simple ap-
proximations. Cheung [28] has improved our asymptotic bound on this quantity by showing
that
1
2t
t−1∑
m=0
√(
t
m
)(
t
m+ 1
)
≤ 1− 1
2(t+ 1)
− 1
2t+1
, (43)
which implies
Psucc ≤ 1− 1/4(t+ 1). (44)
It follows that
Ppass ≤ 1− 1/8(t+ 1), (45)
which we recall is an upper bound on the probability that Bob’s swap-test passes in any
particular kernel-iteration, when Eve is acting as a dishonest prover and using t copies of the
public key. Thus, as we argued in Section 3.1 (and the Appendix), the total probability that
Eve causes all s of Bob’s swap-tests to pass is
Pr[Eve fools Bob on first attempt, using t copies]
≤ (1− 1/8(t+ 1))s,
as claimed in Lines (9) and (10). This completes the proof of security of the protocol.
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Appendix
Consider the following non-cryptographic, two-message interactive protocol (or game) between
Evelyn and Bobby (neither of whom is considered adversarial, hence we distinguish these two
players from Eve and Bob), denoted L = L(Φ), where Φ is a quantum operation (super-
operator) that specifies Evelyn’s action in Step 2’ below (the quantities r and t are as defined
previously):
• (1’) Bobby chooses a uniformly random x ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2r+ 1} and creates a (t+ 3)-qubit
system in the state |ψx〉⊗(t+1)(|0〉|1〉+ |1〉|0〉); Bobby sends to Evelyn t copies of |ψx〉 as
well as one qubit of the system in the state |0〉|1〉+ |1〉|0〉.
• (2’) Evelyn carries out the quantum operation Φ on the received qubits which outputs
one qubit, which Evelyn sends to Bobby.
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• (3’) Bobby measures the received qubit in the computational basis {|0〉, |1〉}; if the mea-
surement outcome is “1”, then he applies the Pauli-Z gate
Z :=
[
1 0
0 −1
]
(46)
to the qubit of the system in the state |0〉|1〉 + |1〉|0〉 that he kept in Step 1’. Finally,
Bobby swap-tests this qubit with his remaining copy of |ψx〉.
The following proposition is immediate:
Proposition 3. The probability that Eve causes Bob’s swap-test to pass in any particular
iteration of the protocol in Section 2.1 is at most
α := max
Φ
Pr[Bobby’s swap-test passes in L(Φ)], (47)
where Φ ranges over all admissible quantum operations that Evelyn can apply in Step 2’.
Now consider the parallel s-fold repetition of L, which we denote L‖s = L‖s(Φ′), where now
Φ′ is Evelyn’s quantum operation in the second step of L‖s. The following proposition is also
immediate:
Proposition 4. The probability that Eve fools Bob on the first attempt using t copies in the
protocol in Section 2.1 is at most
α′ := max
Φ′
Pr[all of Bobby’s swap-tests pass in L‖s(Φ′)], (48)
where Φ′ ranges over all admissible quantum operations that Evelyn can apply in the second
step of L‖s.
Therefore, in order to prove that it is sufficient to consider individual (as opposed to coher-
ent) attacks by Eve, it suffices to show that α′ = αs.
In Ref. [21], it is shown that the maximum acceptance probability of any two-message
interactive proof system can be expressed as a semidefinite (optimization) program (see Ref.
[29] for a relevant review of semidefinite programming). Before we apply this fact, we need
to make some definitions. Let X and Y be the input and output spaces, respectively, of
Evelyn’s quantum operation Φ in L, i.e. Φ : L (X ) → L (Y), where L (X ) is the space of all
linear operators from the complex Euclidean space X to itself (and likewise for L (Y)). Let
Pos (Y ⊗ X ) denote the set of all positive semidefinite operators in L (Y ⊗ X ). Similarly, for
L‖s, we have that Φ′ : L (X⊗s)→ L (Y⊗s). Viewing Bobby’s swap-test passing as “acceptance”
in an interactive proof system, we thus have, according to Ref. [21], that α and α′ can be
expressed, respectively, as solutions to the following semidefinite programs πα and πα′ :
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πα
maximize: Tr(B†X)
subject to: TrY(X) = IX ,
X ∈ Pos (Y ⊗ X )
πα′
maximize: Tr((B⊗s)†X ′)
subject to: TrY⊗s(X
′) = IX⊗s,
X ′ ∈ Pos ((Y ⊗ X )⊗s) ,
where X and X ′ are the Choi-Jamio lkowski representations of Φ and Φ′, and B is a positive
semidefinite operator representing Bobby’s actions, i.e., B ∈ Pos (Y ⊗ X ). Furthermore, it
is shown in Ref. [21] that such semidefinite programs (arising from two-message interactive
proof systems) satisfy the condition of strong duality, which means that the solution to each
semidefinite program above coincides with that of its dual.
In Ref. [22], the following theorem is proven:
Theorem 5 ([22]). Suppose that the following two semidefinite programs π1 and π2 satisfy
strong duality:
π1
maximize: Tr(J†1X)
subject to: Φ1(X) = C1,
X ∈ Pos (X1)
π2
maximize: Tr(J†2X)
subject to: Φ2(X) = C2,
X ∈ Pos (X2) ,
where Φ1 : L (X1)→ L (Y1) and Φ2 : L (X2)→ L (Y2), for complex Euclidean spaces X1,Y1,X2,Y2,
and J1 ∈ L (X1) and J2 ∈ L (X2) are Hermitian. Let α(π1) and α(π2) denote the semidefinite
programs’ solutions. If J1 and J2 are positive semidefinite, then the solution to the following
semidefinite program, denoted π1 ⊗ π2, is α(π1 ⊗ π2) = α(π1)α(π2):
π1 ⊗ π2
maximize: Tr((J1 ⊗ J2)†X)
subject to: Φ1 ⊗ Φ2(X) = C1 ⊗ C2,
X ∈ Pos (X1 ⊗ X2) .
Since B is positive semidefinite and πα′ = π
⊗s
α (using the associativity of ⊗), Theorem 5
can be applied s−1 times in order to prove that α′ = αs as required. See Ref. [30] for a similar
approach, based on ideas in Ref. [31].
Note that this argument, combined with the arguments in the main body of the paper,
shows that both the serial and parallel versions of our identification protocol are secure.
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